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ABSTRACT
As  well  as  a  consideration  of  the  role  contributed  by  national  supervisors  in  the  successful 
implementation and enforcement of standards, recommendations and regulations, the significance 
of  clear  and  unambiguous  mandates  in  enhancing  communication  between  micro  prudential 
supervisors (usually national financial supervisors and central banks) and macro prudential bodies 
which are responsible for writing the laws that are enforced by micro prudential supervisors, will be 
highlighted in this paper. This will incorporate a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages 
inherent in clear, explicit mandates – such a discussion necessitating a distinction between financial 
stability and monetary policy objectives. 
Furthermore, the role of credit ratings and their significance in influencing investor choices and 
judgments, will be considered as a means of highlighting how they contribute to the neglect of 
risks, exposures attributed to certain financial instruments, and ultimately, systemic risks which de 
stabilize the financial system.
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Successfully Implementing Major Financial Stability Regulatory Reforms: The 
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Introduction
“Micro  prudential  supervisors  have  a  key role,  because  stable  institutions  are  an  essential  and 
necessary condition  for  achieving  financial  stability  –  which  is  why the  European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs) and national supervisors together with the central banks, are members of the 
ESRB and why the ESRB and the ESAs comprise the European System of Financial Supervisors.”3
Whilst financial stability could be defined as “a condition in which the financial system – which 
comprises financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is capable of withstanding 
shocks and the impact of financial  imbalances,”4 financial  instability,  it  is  contended, generally 
refers to two types of phenomenon which are considered to be closely linked, namely:5
- Large movements in asset prices
- Financial distress of institutions
In other words, financial stability objectives and cycles can usually be discerned and distinguished 
from those of monetary policy where significant changes in asset prices or financial distress occurs. 
 In highlighting the aims, objectives of this paper, as set out within the abstract,  this paper will 
commence with a section on Financial stability and monetary policy objectives – a section which is 
aimed at highlighting why monetary policy objectives are less flexible and more rigid than financial 
stability  objectives.  Section  two  then  proceeds  to  consider  the  synergetic  relationship  between 
monetary  policy  setting  and  prudential  frameworks.  The  third  section  is  committed  to  a 
consideration of the European Systemic Risk Board, its objectives, composition and non binding 
powers. Section four will then go  on to highlight  why „clear and explicit“ objectives are required 
in order to achieve clarity about mandates. This will be followed by a section which elaborates on 
the Basel Committee's tasks and challenges in its efforts to facilitate financial stability. Section six 
will then consider what roles national supervisors can play in facilitating the Basel Committee's 
efforts to achieve financial stability objectives. This will then be followed by section seven – which 
highlights the importance of risks and risk based weightings in triggering financial instability – 
before a conclusion is derived.
1  National supervisors impliedly comprise national financial supervisors and central banks. National supervisors are 
distinguished  from  micro  prudential  supervisors  where  reference  is  also  made  to  the  European  Supervisory 
Authorities. Whilst national supervisors are also micro prudential supervisors, micro prudential supervisors could 
also comprise national financial supervisors, central banks and the European Supervisory Authorities.
2 School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford and Lessing Trebing Bert Rechtsanwälte, 
Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
3  JC Trichet, “Taking Stock on Financial Reform” Opening Speech by the President of the European Central Bank at 
the Frankfurt Finance Summit, “The Future of Risk management and Regulation: Smarter Regulation, Safer 
Markets, Frankfurt am Main, 23 March 2011 < http://www.bis.org/review/r110324a.pdf>
4  European Central Bank, see preface of Financial Stability Review June 2011 at page 9 < 
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201106en.pdf?628667d5a27d080f284591a4dfd18378>
5 See Speech by Andrew Crockett, “In Search of Anchors For Financial and Monetary Stability”, at the SUERF 
Colloquium in Vienna, 27-29 April 2000 < http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp000427.htm>
A. Financial Stability v Monetary Policy Objectives
Financial stability functions and objectives are generally considered to be less defined and more 
ambiguous than monetary policy objectives. There are several plausible explanations for this – and 
which justify whether monetary policies should be more rigid and less flexible. The question is 
presented as to whether “monetary policy should be directed at limiting the build up of financial 
imbalances. In particular, should monetary policy respond to perceived asset price misalignments 
which in the central bank’s view, threaten financial stability?”6 It is added, further, that the response 
to this (as well as such response being “the conventional view”), is that they should not (monetary 
policies should not respond to perceived asset price alignments which are considered to threaten 
financial stability).7  
Four reasons which have been put forward to bolster this response are as follows:8
- Monetary  policy  should  only  respond  to  asset  prices  to  the  extent  that  they  provide 
information about future inflation.
- Central bank’s efforts to avoid imbalances from building-up9 would be futile since by the 
time it is able to form firm judgment about its existence, it would be too late (“pricking a 
bubble in its latter stages would only aggravate the instability which it is intended to avert”).
- The response of asset prices to monetary policy is highly unpredictable as well as dependent 
on market sentiments.
- Who is able to predict with confidence that an asset price movement is a bubble and not 
merely a reflection of fundamental/basic asset values?”
B. Synergies between Monetary Policy Setting and Prudential Frameworks
Is it preferable to create an agency whose monetary policy functions are distinct and separate from 
those  of  its  prudential  and  financial  stability  objectives?  The  following  section  is  aimed  at 
highlighting  the  synergetic  relationships  between  monetary  policy  setting  and  prudential 
frameworks.
In order to counter the belief and argument that macro prudential frameworks could lead to conflicts 
between monetary and macro prudential actions, two reasons have been put forward to bolster the 
likelihood that macro prudential policy and monetary policy will be complementary and congruent 
to each other – rather than moving in opposite directions:10
i) The fact that financial  cycles associated with serious financial  distress tend to be 
considerably longer than typical business cycles – which implies that most of the 
6ibid
7 ibid
8  ibid
9  It is argued that “Monetary policy makers will need to keep an eye on longer-term trends if they are to take into 
account the gradual build-up and unwinding of financial imbalances and their economic and inflationary effects.” 
See J Caruana, „Monetary Policy in a World with Macro Prudential Policy“ Bank for International Settlement 
Publications < http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110610.htm>
10  ibid
time, monetary policy makers can treat macro prudential policy developments as a 
relatively slow moving background.11
ii) The need to think in terms of a policy hierarchy – a good example being the potential 
set  of  responses  to  strong capital  inflows.  Capital  inflows  into  emerging  market 
economies can put strong upward pressure on domestic inflation, as well as on credit 
and asset price growth. In this situation, the top priority is to apply macroeconomic 
policies  -  including  monetary,  fiscal  and  exchange  rate  measures  -  to  safeguard 
domestic financial stability.” 12
The complementary and synergetic natures of functions relating to financial stability, as well as 
monetary policy setting functions, the need to couple such functions, is reflected by the following 
macro prudential oversight frameworks:13
11  “It also means that the pursuit of price stability over horizons of just two years or so, is no longer fully appropriate.”
12 “The appropriate  role of macro prudential policy is to curb excessive risk-taking by the domestic financial system. Such 
restraint might well help to cool aggregate demand and, as such, should to be taken into account by monetary policy. But the 
use of macro prudential policy should not be used as an excuse to postpone or reduce the inevitable tightening of monetary 
policy.” See ibid
13  See European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review December 2010 at page 61
As illustrated by the diagram above, the central bank constitutes part of the embracing body as its 
expertise  is  required  in  the  overall  objectives  of  the  respective  macro  prudential  frameworks. 
Greater  focus  should  be  dedicated  to  the  identification  and  diagnosis  of  risks  rather  than  the 
preventative and remedial stages. Even where aggregate risks which exist at Euro wide level differ 
from those which exist at the micro prudential level, the identification of threatening risks at an 
early stage would eventually help mitigate or prevent the build-up of potentially threatening and 
dangerous risks at system level.
The issuing of warnings to the relevant actors and the recommendation of appropriate actions, a 
specific objective of the ESRB, is considered to be “closely linked to the scope of warnings and 
Recommendations”. It is also highlighted that even though it is not possible to specify in advance 
an appropriate scope for potential warnings and recommendations, it  is still  possible to identify 
those who might be responsible for taking appropriate policy or supervisory action.14
In  certain  jurisdictions  the  micro  prudential  supervisor  may  also  be  responsible  for  executing 
monetary policy setting functions as well as macro prudential decisions (for example, the central 
bank). Where the central bank has policy responsibility for BOTH monetary and financial stability, 
the ranking of certain objectives is considered to be desirable. Which objectives should be more 
highly ranked than others? Monetary or financial stability objectives? Need for independence and 
accountability where both distinct functions (monetary policy setting functions as well as macro 
prudential decisions) are exercised by the central bank. Could be argued that prompt urgent actions 
which need to be taken in order to restore stability back to the financial system should take priority 
over monetary objectives – the duration for which such objectives should take pre eminence being 
also  subject  to  the  required  length  or  duration  of  time  to  restore  the  financial  system back to 
normality. In such circumstances, where real serious threats are likely to endanger the financial 
system, monetary policy objectives would need to be flexible to the extent that they permit such 
changes  in  priority  –  through  the  incorporation  of  clauses  which  allow  for  such  alteration  or 
amendments to be executed.
Several  arguments which justify the central  bank’s  responsibility in executing macro prudential 
decisions – one of which includes its ability to obtain information which is required for its functions 
and responsibilities. Three basic ways through which the central bank can obtain such information 
include:15
- If  the  central  bank is  the  micro  supervisor,  it  may have  direct,  first-hand access  on an 
ongoing basis, through an onsite power (for the supplementation of the right to call  for 
reports).
- The central bank may be able to obtain bank-specific information – as well as undertake due 
diligence inspections when prompted by concerns, using its own or specialized contract staff 
– even where it is not responsible for supervision.16
- The central bank may obtain its information from other agencies such as a micro prudential 
supervisor.  Such  information  sharing  may  be  a  legal  obligation,  the  subject  of  a 
memorandum of understanding, or simply considered good practice.
C. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)
I. Establishment and Objectives
Whilst the US Financial Stability Oversight Council was established by the US Dodd Frank Act, the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established on the basis of Article 95 of the EC Treaty 
14 “At  the  EU  level,  for  example,  this  would  include  the  new European  Supervisory  Authorities,  which  will  be 
responsible for, among other things, developing technical standards, ensuring compliance among national supervisors 
with appropriate community law and eventually direct supervision of some EU wide institutions, notably Credit rating 
Agencies”. 
See Section 6.2.2.2 Commission Staff  Working  Document Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community Macro Prudential Oversight of the Financial 
System and Establishing a European Systemic Risk Board. < http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=SEC:2009:1234:FIN:EN:PDF>
15  See Bank for International Settlements, “Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability” A Report by a Study 
Group May 2011 <http:www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> at pages 34 and 35
16  “The central bank may be legally empowered to obtain such information or it may succeed because its actual or 
potential counterparties agree to provide it.”
as “a body without legal personality.”17
The objective of the ESRB is considered to be three fold:18 
- Developing a European macro prudential perspective to address the problem of fragmented 
individual risk analysis at national level
- Enhancing  the  effectiveness  of  early  warning  mechanisms  by improving  the  interaction 
between micro and macro prudential analysis
- Allowing for risk assessments to be translated into action by the relevant authorities.
II. Non Binding Powers of the ESRB
Article 5 of the Regulations19 states that the ESRB “will not have any binding powers to impose 
measures on Member States or national authorities.” Instead, Commission proposals describe the 
ESRB as a “reputational body with a high level composition that should influence the actions of 
policy makers and supervisors by means of its moral authority.”
By virtue  of  Article  95  of  the  EC  Treaty,  mandate  is  also  given  to  the  ESRB to  request  for 
information from national supervisors where such information has not been provided. 
Owing to  the non-legally binding effects  of the ESRB’s recommendations,  its  authority (or the 
ability of other authorities to comply with its instructions or mandate) may be questioned. However, 
its recommendations cannot simply be ignored. Addressees of recommendations must state whether 
they agree with its recommendations or not.”20 
- The inability of the ESRB to issue binding recommendations has led some to describe it as a 
“toothless talking shop” which will duplicate activities already undertaken by other national 
and international institutions.21
III. Structure of the ESRB
The ESRB is comprised of: i) a General Board ii) a Steering Committee and iii) a Secretariat 
The General Board serves as the decision making body of the ESRB and its membership consists 
17  “The legal  basis on which the ESRB has been established endows it  with a  mandate which covers the entire 
financial sector without exceptions.” See International Association of Risk and Compliance Professionals (IARCP), 
“The European Systemic Risk Board “ < http://european-systemic-risk-board.com>
18  See House of Commons Select Committees, “The Committee’s Opinion on Proposals for European Financial 
Supervision” < http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmeuleg/5-i/5i04.htm>
19  13648/09, Explanatory Memorandum and Commission Staff Working  Document Accompanying Document to the 
Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  Community  Macro  Prudential 
Oversight of the Financial System and Establishing a European Systemic Risk Board.
20  “Given its wide scope and the sensitivity of its missions, the ESRB is not to be conceived as a body with legal 
personality and binding powers but rather as a body drawing its legitimacy from its reputation for independent 
judgments,  high  quality  analysis  and  sharpness  in  its  conclusions.”  See  International  Association  of  Risk  and 
Compliance  Professionals  (IARCP),  “The  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  “  <  http://european-systemic-risk-
board.com>
21  See House of Commons Select Committees, “The Committee’s Opinion on Proposals for European Financial 
Supervision” < http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmeuleg/5-i/5i04.htm>
of:22 
- Governors of the 27 national central banks
- The President and the Vice President of the European Central bank
- A Member of the European Commission
- The Chairpersons of the three European Supervisory Authorities
Given the complex structure of the European Systemic Risk Board, explicit and clear mandate will 
be required in order to facilitate effective execution of its functions as well as avoid a duplication of 
functions. Certain levels of authority will need to be assigned with tasks relating to the detection, 
monitoring, prevention, mitigation, remedial and management functions relating to risk. 
Micro  prudential  supervisors  will  have  a  crucial  role  to  play  in  reporting  risks  which  could 
constitute serious threats to the stability of their financial systems as well as at macro prudential/EU 
wide level. In this respect, the micro supervisory role assumed by the European System of Financial 
Supervisors (which comprises a collaboration between the new European Supervisory Authorities 
and national financial supervisors) will be fundamental. The micro prudential supervisory element 
of the ESRB should, to a greater extent, be involved in the early detection of risks which could 
constitute significant threats of systemic risks at micro – as well as macro level. For this purpose, 
greater focus had previously been attached to micro supervision.
D. Distinction Between Macro Supervisory Level  arrangements and Micro supervisors 
and the Need for “Clear and Unambiguous” Mandate
Micro prudential supervisors generally enforce rules whilst macro prudential coordinating bodies 
could establish rules which the micro prudential supervisor implements.23 As a result, there is need 
for clear unambiguous mandate and consistency in the application of standards, recommendations 
and regulations.
However, “even where another agency has the power to determine micro prudential instruments and 
even though macro prudential standard setters write laws which are being enforced by national 
supervisors,  such  supervisors  still  operate  with  autonomy and accountability”.24 Such need  for 
autonomy and accountability, as well as ensuring consistent application of decisions regarding the 
composition of  regulatory capital  (as well  as  consistency in  the application of  other  standards) 
across jurisdictions, also provides greater justification for “clear and unambiguous” mandate.
Consequences of failing to implement Basel III in a manner which is consistent across the globe, 
include those resulting in “a competitive race to the bottom as well as increase risks to the global 
financial  system.”25 It  is  proposed that  the Basel Committee’s Standards  Implementation Group 
(SIG) takes  action  through initiatives  such as  its  peer  review process,  through which  teams of 
experts  are  able  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  countries  have  implemented  Basel  Committee 
standards.26
22  ibid
23  However, some micro prudential supervisors are endowed with the authority to issues rules and regulations. See 
Bank for International Settlements, “Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability” A Report by a Study Group 
May 2011 <http:www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> at page 56
24  See ibid at page 60
25  See D Tarullo, “Capital and Liquidity Standards” June 16 , 2011 < 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20110616a.htm>
26  See ibid
The stipulation of objectives in a “clear and explicit” manner, is considered27 to be “a powerful way 
of achieving clarity about the mandate. The articulation of a financial stability strategy within a 
clearly specified mandate being one such possibility of achieving clarity about the mandate – for 
example, by embedding the highest level objectives in statute, and then amplifying and interpreting 
the evolving understanding of what they imply for policy through high level strategy statements.”28
Financial stability functions and objectives, it is argued29, are often considered to be less defined 
and  more  ambiguous  than  monetary  policy  objectives.  Hence  financial  stability  functions  and 
objectives could be considered to be in greater need of more defined, clearer, and more explicit 
mandates.  Reasons attributed to the need for explicit mandates with explicit objectives in order to 
facilitate effective execution of the financial stability function are as follows: 30 
- It helps those in the private sector that are subject to policy to be able to predict the likely 
direction of official actions under different scenarios
- Policy actions to constrain risk taking activities which threaten financial stability 
However,  even though advantages exist in stipulating clear mandates, certain disadvantages also 
emanate from the stipulation of mandates in a “clear and explicit” way which does not provide for 
flexibility in relation to an area such as financial stability – an area which, to a large extent, involves 
contingency issues31 and uncertainty.
E. Basel Committee’s Tasks and Challenges in its Efforts to Facilitate Financial Stability.
Basel III macro prudential measures aimed at facilitating financial stability will,  to a significant 
extent,  realize  their  desired results  where consistently applied across jurisdictions.  Furthermore, 
enhanced  transparency  in  relation  to  Basel  internal  credit  models  will  help  facilitate  market 
discipline. In its efforts to implement and achieve Basel requirements, national supervisors will play 
crucial  roles  in  the  translation  of  Basel  Committee’s  standards  and  requirements  into  national 
legislation. Three important actors are involved in the link between macro prudential power players 
- namely; standard setters, central banks and national supervisors.
27 Bank for International Settlements, “Central Bank Governance and Financial Stability” A Report by a Study Group 
May 2011 <http:www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> at page  30
28  See ibid at pages 30 and 31;It is further added that such arrangements need to ensure the compatibility of financial 
stability operations with monetary policy responsibilities; see ibid
29  “Maintain financial stability is less easily interpreted than maintain price stability since price stability can be 
numerically approximated in terms of a generally agreed index – whereas financial stability cannot. Furthermore, 
financial stability objectives are often expressed in directional, rather than absolute terms: for example, “to promote” 
or “to support” or “to endeavour to achieve”. No metric exists to understand  how  much  promoting, supporting or 
endeavouring is intended.” See Bank for International Settlements, “Central Bank Governance and Financial 
Stability” A Report by a Study Group May 2011 <http:www.bis.org/publ/othp14.pdf> at page 28
30  See ibid at page 29
31  “Given the current state of knowledge about what constitutes financial stability, and its main drivers, attempting to 
direct policy actions by way of explicit objectives, may create practical difficulties. Three reasons being:
- It would be unfortunate if explicit objectives excluded policy options which turn out to be favorable
- A clear objective statement directing the policy to ensure financial stability, without indicating the 
limits to which the authorities are prepared to insure private agents against tail risk events, may induce 
greater risk taking than available policy instruments are able to cope with.
- The unpredictability of financial crises
For these reasons, it is important to have flexible legislation which is adaptable to potential changes” see ibid at page 
30
In ensuring consistent application of decisions regarding the composition of regulatory capital as 
well  as  consistent  application  of  other  regulatory  standards  across  jurisdictions,  other  national 
supervisors such as financial  supervisors will  also play a crucial  role in the Basel Committee’s 
efforts and initiatives to achieve this objective since they constitute a vital link between standard 
setters and central banks. 
F. Roles of National Supervisors
1) National supervisors are required to evaluate whether the risk weights are considered to be 
too low based on the default experience for certain types of exposures in their jurisdiction – 
and as a result, may require that banks increase the risks weights as desired.32
2) National supervisors are responsible for determining whether an external credit assessment 
institution (ECAI) meets the criteria listed - such assessments of ECAIs being subjected to 
recognition  on  a  limited  basis.33 With  the  “mapping  process”,  national  supervisory 
authorities are also required to assign the ratings of the recognized rating agencies to the risk 
weight categories (rating grades) in the Standardised Approach.34 
3) National  supervisors  are  expected  to  implement  directives  with  limited  scope  where  a 
deviation  from  the  standard  through  differential  application  of  their  regulatory  and 
supervisory authority occur.
The success  and effectiveness  of  macro prudential  bodies  such as the European Systemic Risk 
Board  (ESRB)  depends  on  successful  implementation  and  enforcement  by  micro  prudential 
supervisors  of  standards,  rules  and  regulations  written  at  macro  prudential  level.  Furthermore, 
certain “conditions for success” for such macro prudential bodies include:35
- “Accessibility by central  banks to relevant data and information for risk assessment and 
monitoring of vulnerabilities in the EU financial system. The ESRC will require a reliance 
on  efficient  and  effective  institutional  mechanisms  which  ensure  adequate  information 
sharing with micro prudential supervisors and the European authorities.
- The need for effective translation of risk warnings into concrete recommendations on macro 
prudential policies which require follow up actions by competent authorities – this requiring 
adequate mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement.
- The need for swift and comprehensive coordination between the ESRC, the IMF and the 
FSB.”
32  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards : A Revised Framework Updated November 2005” paragraphs 71 and also 73< 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf> 
33  See paragraph 90;  ibid
34  “The criteria  for  recognizing rating agencies,  the  usability of  external  ratings  and the mapping process  being 
described  under  paragraphs  91  to  108  of  the  ”International  Convergence  of  Capital  Measurement  and  Capital 
Standards : A Revised Framework Updated November 2005”. In the case of rating agencies seeking recognition in 
several EU member states, a joint assessment process is carried out among the EU member states concerned. The 
decision on the recognition of the rating agencies still lies with the relevant national supervisory authority.”
See Deutsche Bundesbank, „Basel II: Standardised Approach for Credit Risk: External Rating“ < 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_kreditrisiko.en.php
35  See G Tumpel-Gugerell, “The New Financial Architecture and the Role of Europe” May 2009 
>http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090519.en.html>
G. Importance of Risks and Risk Based Weightings in Triggering Financial Instability.
According to the ECB’s Financial Stability Review,36 the most significant risks faced by Euro area 
insurers  are:  Financial  market/investment  risks,37 risks  for  the  profitability  of  guaranteed  life 
insurance products that  yields on AAA rated government bonds remain at  low levels,38 risks of 
market driven and unexpected rise in long term interest rates resulting in investment losses, credit 
and  equity  investment  risks,  risks  associated  with  moderate  recovery  in  economic  activity, 
contagion risks from banking activities via links to banks and other financial institutions, and risks 
of losses from a catastrophic event which exceeds projected losses.
Credit rating agencies39, the under estimation of risks attributed to certain assets, the opacity of 
internal  risk  models  and  credit  ratings  contributed  to  a  significant  extent  in  the  triggering  of 
financial instability which ultimately lead to the break out of the recent Financial Crisis. Where 
such  important  actors  such  as  credit  rating  agencies  are  relied  upon by market  participants  in 
providing sensitive information relating to asset values, the provision of inaccurate information will 
inevitably result in the de stabilization of the financial system. Where ratings provided reflect over 
rated values which have induced investors to invest in worthless assets or the provision of loans to 
borrowers  whose  ratings  were  considered  acceptable,  resulting  in  low quality  bank  loans  (and 
subsequently huge losses to such investors or institutions), the ability of such institutions to meet 
their obligations as they fall due without incurring unacceptable losses will be crucial – that is, the 
level of liquid assets retained by such institutions will be vital.
Counterparty  risks  constituted  a  fundamental  component  of  the  risks  which  resulted  in  the 
triggering of the recent Financial Crisis – such risks also being attributed to complex structured 
products and securities which were inaccurately rated and considered to have been “risk free” and 
which later turned out not to be. They also account for a significant proportion of the risks attributed 
to Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets. As part of efforts aimed at mitigating counterparty 
credit risks, a consensus was reached by G20 leaders that all standardized derivatives should be 
cleared through central counterparties latest by the end of 2010. Non-centrally cleared contracts are 
to be subjected to higher capital  requirements to reflect their  risk levels  and more consolidated 
bilateral counterparty risk management requirements.40
Where the Basel Committee’s attempts to improve investors’ understanding of risk profiles of banks 
is  countered  by  inaccurate  information  provided  by  credit  rating  agencies,  such  efforts  and 
initiatives to allow market participants to exercise discipline, are likely to prove futile. 
36  See June 2011 Report at page s 112 -117  < http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201106en.pdf?
628667d5a27d080f284591a4dfd18378>
37  “At the end of 2010 large euro area insurers continued to exhibit high exposure to government and corporate bonds, 
although there were some differences in investment strategies across institutions.” See ibid at page 112
38 „While lower levels of AAA-rated government bond yields have bolstered the valuation of insurers’ available-for-
sale fixed income investments, they continue to pose challenges”; see ibid
39 Despite the increasing levels of US government bond yields, spreads on AAA-rated corporate bonds remained 
broadly unchanged over the review period. See ECB Financial Stability Review June 2011 at page 34.
40  See Financial Stability Board, „Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms“ October 2010 at page 23
< https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101025.pdf>
A major  hurdle  still  persists  in  the successful  implementation and harmonisation of  two major 
financial regulatory reforms: The Basel III framework and the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act. 
Consequences emanating as a result of the introduction of the Dodd Frank Act are not only based on 
the findings of Congress, but also „because of the systemic importance of credit ratings and the 
reliance placed on credit ratings by individual and institutional investors and financial regulators.“41
Credit risk models under Basel Accords were respectively criticized for facilitating capital arbitrage 
(Basel 1) and for being extremely risk sensitive (Basel II). However, as discussed under a previous 
paper,42 harmonization through common and general application of standards, principles, rules and 
norms are essential in the goal to mitigate regulatory arbitrage practices. Would the implementation 
of the Dodd Frank Act exacerbate regulatory arbitrage practices or is it an attempt to avoid the 
problems attributed to deficiencies of Basel requirements whereby the reliability Basel credit ratings 
as a means of determining risk weights have been questioned?
An  area  which  has  attracted  much  attention  recently  is  the  potential  for  differences  in  the 
calculation of risk-weighted assets across banks – both currently and prospectively under Basel III 
standards – with particular reference to a focus by market participants on differences in measured 
risk exposure.43 Many analysts have observed and highlighted the fact that large US banks generally 
have markedly higher average risk weights, ratios of risk-weighted assets to total assets, and ratios 
of common equity to total assets (adjusted for differences in accounting”, than some of their foreign 
competitors. Furthermore, it is added that “these large disparities cannot be easily explained through 
differences  in  risk  profiles,  which  are  largely  similar  within  the  business  lines  of  competing 
banks.”44
Reasons for the inability to fully account for such large disparities are attributed to the opacity of 
bank balance sheets – as well as their internal risk models.45
In  accordance  with  Basel  II  (International  Convergence  of  Capital  Measurement  and  Capital 
Standards),  “banks  can  use  the  credit  assessments  (ratings)  of  external  rating  agencies  when 
determining the risk weights in the Standardised Approach (including securitization positions) as 
41 See Section 931(1) of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf>; 
„In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial products have proven to be inaccurate. This 
inaccuracy contributed significantly to the mismanagement of risks by financial institutions and investors, which in turn 
adversely impacted the health of the economy in the United States and around the world. Such inaccuracy necessitates 
increased accountability on the part  of credit  rating agencies.“  See Section 931(5)  of the Dodd Frank Wall  Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act <http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf>
42See M Ojo, „Financial Stability, New Macro Prudential Arrangements and Shadow Banking: Regulatory Arbitrage and 
Stringent Basel III Regulations”
43  D Tarullo, “Capital and Liquidity Standards” June 16 , 2011 < 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20110616a.htm>; Also see  N Wellink, “Basel III: A 
Roadmap to Better Banking Regulation and Supervision” Remarks delivered at the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) 
High Level Meeting on the New Framework to Strengthen Financial Stability and Regulatory Priorities, St 
Petersburg Russia, May 2011 and S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System” 
Remarks delivered at the FSI Conference on Basel III, Basel, April 2011.
44  D Tarullo, “Capital and Liquidity Standards” June 16 , 2011 < 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20110616a.htm
45  “The reliance, to a greater extent, of capital standards, on internal market – risk based models is particularly 
problematic owing to the fact that the basis of parameters and the implementation of such internal market risk 
models are not transparent”; ibid
long as the rating agencies are recognized by the respective national banking supervisors.”46
The Basel Committee proposed “to permit banks a choice between two broad methodologies for 
calculating their capital requirements for credit risk.”47 One option being:
- To measure credit risk in a standardized manner, supported by external credit assessments
The other being:
- Subjected to the explicit approval of the bank’s supervisor, which would allow banks to use 
their internal ratings systems for credit risk.”48
As well as the design of a framework which was never really implemented, unduly sensitive credit 
risk models and the tendency to generate pro cyclical effects, a principal problem attributed to Basel 
II is considered to be “the entire concept of risk weighting” – particularly the idea that certain assets 
are  riskier  than others  and the requirement  that  banks  should  retain  more capital  against  risky 
assets.49
It  is  also predicted that  Basel  III  will  generate  problems related to  risk weights  since the risk 
weights for Basel II were not amended.
Revisions to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord  for risk weighting banking book exposures – as a 
result of the implementation of Basel II
In determining the risk weights under the Standardised Approach, “banks may use assessments by 
external  credit  assessment  institutions  recognized  as  eligible  for  capital  purposes  by  national 
supervisors in accordance with the criteria stated under paragraphs 90 and 91.”50 Thirteen broad 
46  At the EU level, the Basel recommendations for recognizing external rating agencies and the usability of external 
ratings have been implemented in Articles 81 to 83 of the Banking Directive (2006/48/EC). Further,  on the 20 
January 2006, the CEBS published its Guidelines on the recognition of External  Credit Assessment Institutions 
(ECAIs)  in  order  to  achieve  a  maximum level  of  consistency  in  the  interpretation  of  the  Directive  with  this 
respect.”See  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  „Basel  II:  Standardised  Approach  for  Credit  Risk:  External  Rating“  < 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_kreditrisiko.en.php>
47  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards : A Revised Framework Updated November 2005” at page 15  < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf>
48  ibid
49  Two core problems, which in Salmon’s opinion, are linked to this idea are:
- The fact that the idea is backward looking: it assumes that securities which have been risky in the past 
are the same as securities which will be risky in the future
- The  consequence  of  Basel  II  reform  –  which  was  to  discourage  banks  from  lending  to  risky 
enterprises – as well as encouraging the build up of apparently risk-free assets. This latter problem is also 
considered  by  Salmon  to  be  the  primary  contributor  to  “the  structured  finance  craze”  whereby 
securitization was employed as a means of “manufacturing” apparently risk free assets out of risky pools. 
The crippling of banks such as Citigroup and Bank of America, it is contended, was not a result of direct 
exposure to sub prime loans, but exposure to triple A rated debt backed by pools of  such loans – debt 
which  turned  out  not  to  be  risk-free  at  all.”  See  F  Salmon,  “The  Biggest  Weakness  of  Basel  III”< 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/09/15/the-biggest-weakness-of-basel-iii/>
50  The eligibility criteria under paragraph 91 being: Objectivity, independence, international access/transparency, 
disclosure, resources and credibility. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards : A Revised Framework Updated November 2005” at page 15  < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf>he eligibility criteria under paragraph 91 being: Objectivity, independence, 
classes are identified:51
- Claims on sovereigns and their central banks 52
Individual claims on sovereigns and their central banks as provided by the Basel Committee:53
- Claims on non central government public sector entities (PSEs)
- Claims on multilateral development banks (MDBs)54
- Claims on banks: Of which there are two options. National supervisors are to apply one 
option to all banks in their jurisdictions. Under the first option, all banks incorporated in a 
given  country  are  to  be  assigned  “a  risk  weight  one  category  less  favorable  than  that 
assigned to claims on the sovereign of that  country.  55 The second option bases the risk 
weighting on the external credit assessment of the bank itself with claims on unrated banks 
being risk-weighted at 50%.56
- Claims on securities firms: Claims on securities firms may be treated as claims on banks 
provided these firms are subject to supervisory and regulatory arrangements comparable to 
those under  the  framework (which  was prevailing  at  the  time).  Other  wise such claims 
would follow the rules for claims on corporations.57
- Claims on corporate
- Claims included in the regulatory retail portfolios
international access/transparency, disclosure, resources and credibility.> Also see Deutsche Bundesbank, „Basel II: 
Standardised Approach for Credit Risk: External Rating“ < 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_kreditrisiko.en.php>
51  “Classes which are not considered under these headings are to retain the previous current treatment – with the 
exception of exposures  related to  securitization.” See Basel  Committee on Banking Supervision,  “International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards : A Revised Framework Updated November 2005” at 
pages 15-23  < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf>
52  See ibid at paragraph 53; This also embraces claims on the Bank for International Settlements, the IMF, the ECB 
and the European Community: for further discussion in relation to this, see paragraph 56.
53  See Basel Committee on Banking on Banking Supervision,  “International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework Updated November 2005” at page 15 < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf>
54  See ibid at paragraph 59
55  However, for claims on banks in countries with sovereigns rated BB+ to B- and on banks in unrated countries, the 
risk weight is to be capped at 100%. See paragraph 61;ibid
56  See paragraph 62; ibid
57  See paragraph 65; ibid
- Claims secured by residential property (Risk weighted at 35%)
- Claims secured by commercial real estate
- Past due loans
- Higher  risk  categories:  The  following  claims  (according  to  paragraph  79)  being  risk 
weighted at 150% or higher: Claims on sovereigns, PSEs, banks, and securities firms rated 
below B- ; and claims on corporations rated below BB- (and other classes) 
- Other assets
- Off balance sheet items
The Dodd Frank Act not only prohibits US regulators from relying on external credit ratings in any 
regulation  –  thus  „making  the  implementation  of  Basel  reforms  relating  to  securitization  and 
resecuritizations impossible,58 it: 
Places US banks at a possible „competitive disadvantage under Basel III,“59 as well as ; Imposes 
additional cost burdens and problematic implementation issues (in matters relating to consistency, 
comparability and reliability of risk weighting measurements) for foreign financial firms.
„The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed into law on 21 July 
2010. The Act requires all financial companies that have total consolidated assets over $10 billion 
and  that  are  regulated  by  specified  federal  financial  regulators  (namely  the  federal  banking 
regulators,  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  and  the  Commodity  Futures  Trading 
Commission) to conduct an annual stress test. The federal financial regulators are required to issue 
rules  implementing  the  annual  stress-test  requirement.  Each  agency’s  rules  must,  for  entities 
regulated by it, define the term “stress test”, establish methodologies for conducting the stress test 
that include at least three sets of conditions (baseline, adverse and severely adverse), and establish 
the form and content of a report regarding the stress test which must be submitted to the Federal 
Reserve Board and to the entity’s primary federal financial regulator.“60
58  See H Scott, „Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at pages 766-767.
59  See Speech by Stefan Walter, Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Risk Europe 
Pre Conference Summit, Brussels 4 April 2011.
60  European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review December 2010 at page 124 
<http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview201012en.pdf> (last visited 3 June 2011)
H. CONCLUSION
In order to maximize the potential to derive optimal results from the synergies between financial 
stability  and  monetary  policy  objectives,  the  synergetic  relationships  between  monetary  policy 
setting and prudential frameworks need to be understood. The role played by national supervisors, 
particularly central banks which are responsible for monetary policy setting functions as well as 
macro  prudential  issues  has  been  emphasized  in  this  respect.  The  benefits  attributed  to  micro 
prudential supervisors such as central banks, their expertise and ability to gather crucial, timely and 
accurate information has also been highlighted. Other supervisors who also constitute the micro 
prudential supervisory function will also play a crucial role in the Basel Committee’s efforts and 
initiatives  to  achieve  the  objective  of  facilitating  and  sustaining  financial  stability  since  they 
constitute a vital link between standard setters and central banks.
Even though advantages exist  in stipulating clear mandates, certain disadvantages also emanate 
from the stipulation of mandates in a “clear and explicit” way which does not provide for flexibility 
in  relation  to  an  area  such  as  financial  stability  –  an  area  which,  to  a  large  extent,  involves 
contingency issues and uncertainty.
Whilst the Basel Committee’s determination of risk weights (and indeed the entire risk weighting 
process)  and  the  reliability  of  credit  ratings  as  means  of  determining  risk  weights  have  been 
questioned,  and could be attributed to the Dodd Frank Act’s  prohibition of US regulators from 
relying on external credit ratings in any regulation – thus „making the implementation of Basel 
reforms relating to securitization and resecuritizations impossible”, such a move might make it even 
more difficult to achieve consistency and harmonization – factors which are considered necessary to 
facilitate the Basel Committee’s initiatives in attaining and sustaining financial stability objectives. 
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